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Public School Financing in the United
States: More on the Dark Side
of Intermediate Structures
John C.Reitz*
Like Professor Inoue's article, The Poverty of Rights-Blind
Communality: Looking Through the Window of Japan,' this
article provides evidence of the dark side of intermediate
structures. The intermediate structure-that is, the social and
political structure standing between the individual and the
state-which this article describes is the local public school
board and its associated property taxing district. The dark side
of this structure is the persistence of extraordinary inequities
in public school financing. These inequalities persist because
local funding through public school districts has been
considered vital to ensure local control over schools, and local
control has been considered to outweigh the interest in equality
of funding. This negative aspect of local school boards seems all
the darker because local control by the school boards has
proven largely illusory. Although local school districts may be
thought to mediate between the individual and the state in
positive ways, their actual role in public school finance has
come to be one of preventing the sigmficant wealth transfers
that are necessary to provide even rough equality in public
educatioa2

* Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges helpful discussions with innumerable colleagues and friends, research
advice and comments on written drafts by colleagues Eric Andersen, William G.
Buss, and Larry Ward, as well as research assistance on German law from
her ma^ Piinder, none of whom, however, are to be blamed for the author's
opinions and errors. Unless otherwise noted, translations are by the author.
1. 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.517.
2.
There is a substantial body of literature discussing whether there is any
demonstrable correlation between expenditures on education and students'
educational achievement. See MARK G. YUWF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL
POLICY AND
THE LAW 596-99 (3d ed. 1992). With respect to the magnitude of disparities
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There are signs of change on the horizon. A number of
states, partly under the pressure of litigation, are increasing
state-wide funding of education in order to reduce, if not
eliminate, funding disparities. However, this article argues that
in rectifying the problem of inequality in public school finance,
i t will not be possible to restore significant control over schools
to the local school boards. Increased state funding is required
in order to reduce funding disparities, and an increase in state
funding seems very likely to accentuate the current trend
toward increased state control over the schools. Voucher plans,
which in effect "marketize" education by giving students and
their families some choice about which school t o attend, may
appear to offer an attractive alternative t o centralized state
control over schools, but marketizing also seems sure to
weaken the role of the school boards and the political processes
that play out before them. If there is any hope for meaningful
community control over schools of the future, that control is
likely to come in the form of local advisory councils to the
individual schools, a structure that obviously cannot be given
the taxing power. Thus the thesis of this article is that the
putative benefits of local control over the public schools can no
longer justify a system of school financing that permits
disparities in district wealth to result in sigmficant disparities
in the tax revenues available to each district for education.
This article pursues this argument as follows. Section I1
outlines the current system of local funding, the disparities
that result, and the benefits to society that are thought to
result from the system of local school board control. The section
concludes with a critical examination of these supposed
benefits. Section I11 describes the litigation that has challenged
the current funding system. Section IV examines, with the help
of a sidelong glance a t Germany, the prospects for meaningful
control by local school boards if centralized state funding is
substantially increased for the sake of equality. This section
highlights the tension between the principles of local control

discussed in this article, it strains credulity to claim that educational opportunity
is not affected. See i n j h notes 7-8 and accompanying text. More importantly,
however, doubts about the correlation provide no rationale for dismissing equality
concerns. The claim of equality is not limited to academic achievement but includes
the general treatment of each student. A disparate allocation of public funds to the
rich is simply unjust. Grossly disparate funding of the public schools is an afFront
to the dignity of the disadvantaged individuals and may produce serious social and
psychological harm.

6231

PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING

625

and equal treatment. It also describes current efforts to
enhance local control at the level of individual public schools.
Section V discusses "marketization" plans for the public
schools, the impact such plans are likely to have on school
boards, and the dynamics of their political processes. Section VI
concludes that the benefits of the traditional self-governing and
self-supporting school district cannot be salvaged and that the
United States should abandon the effort to do so in order to
provide a meaningful degree of equality in the vital areas of
primary and secondary education.
AND
11. THE SYSTEMOF LOCALFINANCING
THE RESULTING
DISPARITIES

Historically, most public schools in the United States were
chiefly financed by local property taxes. With the exception of
Hawaii, public schools in the United States still receive a
significant portion of their funds from property taxes that are
On average, as a rough
locally assessed and ~ollected.~
estimate, about half of the funding comes from the local
communities and half from the state: with the federal
contribution remaining consistently smalL5 For example, in
the late 1970s the average local contribution to public school
budgets was sixty percent of nonfederal funding, with the
states providing the other forty percent. In the 1980s the local
share dropped t o forty-six percent of the nonfederal funding.
More recently, the local share has been on the rise.6
The combination of state and local fmancing for public
schools produces marked disparities in funding. Some of the
disparity is due to substantial differences in the level of wealth
in the various states. For example, in 1988 Connecticut public
schools spent an average of $6230 per pupil while Mississippi
spent an average of $2548,' a difference of about two and onehalf times. But the variations between public school funding in
different districts of one state show even greater disparities.
3.
YUDOFET AL., supra note 2, at 592.
4.
However, a tremendous variation on this point from state to state exists.
For example, in 1984-85, New Hampshire secured 93% of its public school funding
from local taxes and only 7% from state revenues, while California presented
virtually the reverse picture, with 9.4% local funding and 90.6% state funding. Id.
5. Id. at 674 (in 1980 the federal share of primary and secondary education
expenditures was 8.7%; by 1988, it had dropped to 6.2%).
6. Id. at 592.
Id. at 591.
7.
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"In many states, the level of spending in one district within a
state is often three o r four times that of another district within
the state. There are extremes where the differences are as
great as twenty to one or more."8
States have historically attempted to alleviate the
intrastate discrepancies with some form of state equalization
laws, with the result that all states provide some state funding
to the public schools. But these attempts to equalize funding
have not proved successful. The disparities reported above
reflect the financial situation after state equalization. As
Professors Yudof, Kxp, and Levin comment:
[Tlhe equalizing effect [of state equalization laws] is often not
strong, even when these formulas are not encumbered by
special provisions added for political reasons. Typically,
however, legislatures have added "save harmless" provisions
t o their formulas that, for example, guarantee districts the
same amount of aid they received the prior year even though
a straight application of the formula would indicate a
lowering of state aid for that district in the coming year. In
short, the formulas in practice have the effect of maintaining
the disparities among districts in the amount of money spent
per pupil.g

A. The Arguments for Local Funding
The arguments in favor of local funding for public schools
are all rooted in the alleged virtues of local control, which cover
two basic areas: control over the schools themselves, and control over the taxes levied to fmance the public schools. The
control structure is the local school board. Each local school
board is in charge of a school district, which forms a single
taxing district as well. The board consists of members who are
8. Id. at 592. For a passionate description of what these Werences mean to
KOZOL,SAVAGE
INEQUAL~MES
(1991). Kozol
the students involved, see JONATHAN
concludes:
If Americans had to discriminate directly against other people's
children, I believe most citizens would find this morally abhorrent. Denial,
in an active sense, of other people's children is, however, rarely necessary
in this nation. Inequality is mediated for us by a taxing system that most .
people do not fully understand and seldom scrutinize.
Id. at 207.
9. YUDOFEl' AL., supra note 2, at 594. See also KOZOL,supra note 8, at 209
("[Tlhe various 'formulas' conceived-and reconceived each time there is a legal
challenge--to achieve some equity in public education have been almost total
failures.").
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locally elected in the great majority of cases.'' Locally raised
funding for the school district is an important way of assuring
the independence of the school board, so the argument goes, so
that it can function as a truly intermediate structure rather
than a mere agent of the state. The disparities produced by
local financing are thus seen as the price that has to be paid to
secure the benefits of local control.
Locally raised funding even more obviously preserves the
second aspect of local control-the power to determine the level
of tax burden. Local financing of public schools gives the voters
of an individual school district control over a segment of their
tax burden by allowing the voters to decide the amount of property tax they wish to devote to public school education.
The arguments in favor of local control over the schools
and the taxes levied to finance them track the benefits to society generally asserted to result from healthy intermediate
structures." First, local school boards and local property tax
funding serve as a buffer against control by the state, permitting local communities to determine the level of their own commitment to public education and to control how the tax money
is spent. Second, the local school boards provide a "school for
citizenship," training citizens to run the larger democracies of
state and federal governments by first giving them opportunities to manage an important affair on the local level. Third, the
local school district provides a "seedbed for republican virtues"
by creating a local forum in which citizens can practice the
skills of advocacy and compromise necessary to the successful
governance of the larger units of state and nation. Fourth, the
system of local control and funding teaches individuals independence from government because the local school district is
small enough to make many citizens appreciate their direct
responsibility for the quality of the public schools. Fifth, local
control is more likely than state or federal control to produce a
humane delivery of educational services that is attuned to local
concerns. Finally, local control over the public schools and their
financing increases the individual's sense of participation in

10.

Some local school hoards are appointed, but 85% are elected locally. FREDWIRT & MICHAELW. KIRST,SCHOOLS IN CONFLICT:
THE POLITICS
OF
EDUCATION
94 (1982).
See Mary A. Glendon, General Report, Individualism and Communitarianism
11.
in Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REV.385, 390-91 nn. 14-18 and accompanying text.
ERICK M.
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society because each individual has a relatively greater chance
of affecting locally made decisions than decisions made at the
state or federal level.
B. Criticisms of the Local Control Arguments
There are substantial problems with the control arguments
for local financing. First, many of the supposed benefits of local
control over education are not in fact observable today, and
local control over education has been greatly narrowed, perhaps
to the vanishing point. Second, local control over the tax burden for financing public schools is not significant today in light
of the much larger state and federal tax burdens, and the freedom to determine their own level of tax support for public
schools is largely illusory for many districts.12 Both of these
objections raise doubts as to whether local financing, with its
attendant interdistrict inequalities, protects anything of value.
A number of features concerning the operation of local
school boards suggests that the benefits of local control may not
be worth the price exacted by the inequality created in our
system of local fmance. The school boards have proven, for
example, to be rather poor "schools for citizenship." School
board elections have notoriously low voter turnout; voters display "even more indifference [for local school board elections]
than that for other government offices."13 This apathy may
stem from the fact that school board elections are nonpartisan,
often unopposed, or held at inconvenient dates. However, it is
clear that "campaigning in school contests is very limited, candidate visibility is very low, and the contest [is] rarely based on
specific poli~ies."~~
While public participation before the
boards on important issues may be vigorous, it is unclear
whether interested parties would be any less likely to participate if such hearings were held by a state agency instead of a
local school board, as long as the hearings were held in a place
accessible to the local parties.
Even more problematic for the arguments in favor of local
fmancing is the fact that the school boards are increasingly
losing control over the substance of education. All state consti12. Unlike the similar arguments that were advanced in Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), my arguments are not addressed to the issue of constitutionality, but solely to the issue of sound social policy and general fairness.
13. WIRT & IClRfT, supra note 10, at 95.
14.
Id.
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tutions give the state legislature plenary authority over public
education.15 State governments exercise substantial control
over such basic questions as the rules for teacher certification
and tenure, collective bargaining, basic curriculum requirements, and the number of days school is to be in session.16
Since 1983 a flood of state statutes has greatly narrowed the
discretion left to local officials regarding basic school operations. There are now, for example, state statutes regulating
participation in sports, the quality and quantity of homework,
how much time is to be devoted to each subject each day, and
what topics each class must cover.17 Some state statutes even
govern how often announcements may be made over the school
intercom system.18 In addition, numerous state and federal
welfare requirements further diminish local discretion over the
allocation of funds for education.lg
Of course, the situation may vary from state to state, but
the trend everywhere is unmistakable-an increase in centralized control at the expense of control by the local school boards.
15. MARTHAM. MCCARTHY
& NELDAH. CAMBRON-MCCABE,
PUBLIC SCHOOL
LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 2 (3d ed. 1992).
16. Thomas B. Timar & David L. Kirp, Educational Reform and Institutional
Compefence, 57 HARV. EDUC.REV. 308, 309 (1987); see generally Charles F. Faber,
Is Local Control of the Schools Still a Viable Option?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y,
447, 449-52 (1991) (reviewing the growth of state control of education).
In some states, even the textbooks have to be approved by the state. In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Justice Marshall said in his dissenting opinion:
In Texas, statewide laws regulate in fact the most minute details of
local public education. For example, the State prescribes required courses.
All textbooks must be submitted for state approval, and only approved
textbooks may be used. The State has established the qualiGcations necessary for teaching in Texas public schools and the procedures for obtaining
certification. The State has even legislated on the length of the school
day.
Id. at 126-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
17. Timar & Kiip, supm note 16, at 309.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Johanne A. Presser, Frustrations on the Board, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
14, 1992, at 11, 11, stating her personal observations:
As a school-board member I am caught between the ever-increasing
number of state and federal mandates and the ever-dimininhing funding.
The state dictates graduation requirements and the minimum time to be
spent on subjects at the elementary level. AIDS prevention has been
added, but the state insists it be separate from other compulsory drug
and health curricula. Specialeducation statutes require costly individualized educational plans for the mentally, physically and learning-disabled.
Failure to comply with these regulations invites lawsuits, hearings and,
ultimately, withdrawal of state funding.
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As Doyle and Finn wrote almost ten years ago:
"[Llocal control of public education" as traditionally conceived
is in reality disappearing, even though its facade is nearly
everywhere intact. What appears to be happening is that local
school systems are evolving in practice into something that
they always were in a constitutional sense: subordinate administrative units of a state educational system, with some
residual power to modify statewide regulations and procedures in order to ease their implementation within a particular community, and with the residual authority (in most
states, though not all) to supplement state spending with
locally raised revenues.''

Nor is local control over the tax burden of the citizens of
the local school district very sigruficant because the local property tax burden pales in comparison to other state and federal
tax burdens, especially for income taxes.21 The local district
cannot even claim to control the tax burdens attributable solely
to public school financing because on average state funds constitute roughly half of a school district's operating funds.22
More importantly, local control over the tax burden is often
cruelly illusory for the poorest school districts. The school districts that have the least valuable taxable property often have
the highest property tax rates, yet the school taxes they raise
fall far short of the amounts raised by the most affluent school
districts that use lower tax rates.23 Poor school districts are
thus restrained from determining the level of expenditures for

Denis P. Doyle & Chester E. Finn, Jr., American Schools and the Future of
20.
Local Control, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1984, at 77, 90.
Property taxes have been declining significantly as a proportion of the total
21.
tax burden in this country. In 1902, property taxes constituted 41% of all tax revenues raised by all forms of government tax in this country. In 1955, property taxes
accounted for 10%; and in 1989, property taxes raised a mere 7.4% of the total tax
revenue. State and federal personal income taxes now account for the largest block
S. ROSEN,
PUBof tax revenue, 28.3% of the total in both 1955 and 1989. HARVEY
LIC FINANCE23 & fig. 2.2 (3d ed. 1992).
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
22.
23.
For example, in Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250 (Cal. 19711, the
school district with the highest expenditures per pupil in California in 1968-69
applied a property tax rate of only $2.38 per $100 of property valuation, while the
school district with the lowest per pupil expenditures taxed itself at the rate of
$5.48 per $100. Similarly, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1973), the school district with the highest expenditures per
pupil in Texas in 1967-68 taxed itself at the rate of $0.85 per $100, and the school
district with the lowest expenditures per pupil taxed itself at the rate of $1.05 per
$100, the highest rate in the San Antonio metropolitan area.
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schools. As the California Supreme Court said in Serrano v.
Priest:
CSlo long as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries is a major determinant of how much it can spend for its
schools, only a district with a large tax base will be truly able
to decide how much it really cares about education. The poor
district cannot freely choose to tax itself into an excellence
which its tax rolls cannot provide. Far from being necessary
to promote local fiscal choice, the present financing system
actually deprives the less wealthy districts of that option.24

Instead of protecting meaningful choice about the level of
tax support for public education, the system of local financing
operates primarily to prevent the kind of wealth transfers between wealthy and poor districts necessary to achieve greater
equality in public school funding. The system of local financing
may also result in inadequate overall funding for public education. In one sense this is true axiomatically. Since the adequacy
of educational funding for one set of students depends to a
large extent on the level of funding for other sets of students
(who will be in social and economic competition with them),
inequality-particularly severe inequality-in funding necessarily constitutes "inadequate" funding for the disadvantaged
students.
In a related manner, one can argue that leaving the choice
about the level of tax support for public education to such a
small political unit as the school district ensures that the total
amount of taxes raised for public schools is lower than it would
be if school taxes were raised on a state-wide basis. If schools
were financed on a state-wide basis with equal per-student
distribution of tax dollars to all school districts,25 it seems
likely that the average voters would not be satisfied with the
level of school funding until their students-and hence all
students-received at least the same funds as the "average

24. Sermrw, 487 P.2d at 1260. For specific details concerning the lack of choice
supra note 8, at 212 pasavailable to school boards in poor districts, see KOZOL,
sim.
25. However, the level of taxes that would be raised by state-*de financing
might be lower where there is massive flight out of the public schools because
such a flight is likely to weaken the electorate's support for the public schools.
Thus, in order for state-wide financing to reflect the level of financial commitment
the state's population really wants to make to education, families should not be
free to send their children to private schools.
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studentyynow receives. To reach that level of funding for all
students, significant increases in the present tax burden for
education would probably be required. If that is so, the current
system can be said to be underfunding the public schools.
THE DISPARITIES
111. THE LITIGATION'CHALLENGING
The gross disparities in funding between school districts of
the same state have prompted a wave of litigation. As of September 1992, twenty-three states faced litigation over public
school financing.26The plaintiffs in these cases generally raise
two different claims. The most common claim is that the inequalities in public school finance violate the equal protection
clauses of both federal and state constitutions. In 1971, the
California Supreme Court accepted this argument in the landThe flood of litigation that
mark case of Serrano v. Prie~t.~'
Serrano unleashed in other states was dismissed from federal
courts by the United States Supreme Court's 1973 decision in
Sun Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigue~?~
which
established that the inequalities in public school finance do not
violate the federal Equal Protection Clause. Rodriguez, however, does not prevent state supreme courts from ruling, as in the
Serrano case, that state equal protection clauses forbid such
inequality in public school funding. School finance litigation
has therefore been concentrated in state courts. Most of the
pending suits include claims under state equal protection clause ~ The
. supreme
~ ~
courts of at least six states have disagreed
with the Serrano analysis and rejected state equal protection
claims,3' while at least two state supreme courts have agreed
with Serrano?l

26.
William Celis 3 4 23 States h e Suits on S c W Funds, N.Y.TIMES, Sept.
2, 1992, at B7.
27.
487 P.2d 1241, 1266 (Cal. 1971). ARer remanding the case for a trial on
the merits, the court in S e n a m 11, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977) upheld the lower
court's determination that the public school financing system violated the California
Constitution's equal protection provisions.
28.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
29.
Celis, supra note 26, at B7.
30.
See Shofstd v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Lujan v. Colorado State
Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635
(Idaho 1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 k 2 d 758 (Md. 1983);
Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987);
Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 19741, overruled on
other grounds by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Washakie County Sch.
31.
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The second claim in the public school financing cases is one
that can only be asserted under state constitutions, many of
which include language explicitly obligating the state legislature to provide a "thorough and efficienty'public school system.
The seminal case was a 1973 decision issued by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahi11,32which held that New
Jersey's system of public school financing failed to provide a
"thorough and efficient" public school system. The court reasoned that the large disparities in funding resulting from reliance on local taxation indicated that the poor districts were
receiving inadequate funding.33 Although this theory initially
found little favor in other states, by the end of 1990 four other
state supreme courts had followed New Jersey's lead in finding
that a system of public school financing which relies too heavily
on local funding fails to provide "adequate" funding to achieve
the goal of a "thorough" or "efficientyypublic school system.34
This ''adequacy" argument also figures prominently in most of
the pending cases.s5
Under the pressure of these lawsuits, a number of states
have modified their method of public school fmancing to provide a larger role for state funding in a n attempt to minimize
disparities that result from local funding. While it is still too

Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.),'cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
303 A.2d 273 (NJ.1973). The Robinson case returned to the New Jersey
32.
Supreme Court six more times and resulted in passage of the first New Jersey
state income tax. In Robinson V, 355 A.2d 129, 136-38 (NJ. 1976), the court
somewhat reformulated the constitutional requirement to emphasize that a minimum level of educational opportunity for all was required, not necessarily equality
of spending for all students. The cases are summarized and discussed in YUDOFET
AL., supm note 2, at 644-45.
In 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court once again relied on the "thorough
and efficient" clause to find that the large interdistrict disparities in public school
funding that remained even under the New Jersey system as revised in the wake
of the Robinson litigation still violated the state constitution. The court interpreted
the "thorough and efficient" clause to require the state to provide equalization
payments to the poorer urban districts so that, despite local financing, their educational expenditures per pupil would be substantially equivalent to those of the
more afnuent suburban districts and so that their special disadvantages would be
addressed. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
33.
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295-97 (NJ.1973).
34.
See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood ZZ), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). The cases are discussed in YUDOF
ET AL., supra note 2, at 645-48.
35.
Celis, supra note 26, at B7.
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early to determine whether the manifestly unequal system of
local finance for the public school will be eradicated, a modest
trend appears to be emerging to reduce these inequalities by
increasing the amount of state funding.36

Intermediate structures are neither intrinsically good nor
bad. The foregoing discussion suggests that they can have either effect, perhaps even both a t the same time. Comparative
work in this area may help us better appreciate the doubleedged quality of intermediate structures. I do not claim to have
conducted any serious comparative study in the area of primary
and secondary public education, but a superficial glance at one
foreign model is instructive. It suggests that there is a strong
link between funding and control. If that is so, then equality of
funding is inevitably in strong tension with local control.

A. The Germun System
From the standpoint of equality of educational opportunity,
the German example appears laudable. The Germans see their
commitment to equal educational opportunities as stemming,
not so much from the equal protection clause of their constituti0n,3~as from their constitutionally enshrined decision to
make Germany a welfare state (Sozial~taat).~~
Equality in
public school finance is assured in part by relying on the Llinder, the German version of federal states, t o finance the schools.
While there is some local component of public school finance,
principally for school buildings, the bulk of funds for the
schools comes from each Land, including virtually all teacher
salaries.39 The Germans carry their commitment to equality
in funding so far that their constitution exempts from constitutional protection the right to establish private schools that

36.
The New Yo& Times mentions West Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky as
having taken the lead in equalizing public &hod financing.by (1) increasing the
amount of taxes raised at the state level, (2) imposing a cap on how much rich
districts may raise locally for their schools, and (3) increasing the amount of state
aid dispensed to schools, with larger allocations going to the poorer districts. Id.
37.
GRUNDGESE~Z
[Constitution] [GG] art. 3 (F.R.G.).
38.
Thomas Opperma~, Bildung, in BESONDERES
VERWALTUNGSREC~
625
(Hugo von Miinch ed., 5th ed. 1979).
39.
Id. at 643-44.
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would promote a division of students according to the wealth of
their parents.40 As a matter of fact, private schools have even
been found constitutionally entitled to receive state subsidies in
certain cases t o eliminate inequality between public and private finan~ing.~'
The German system is also characterized by thorough state
(Land) control over education. The influence of local communities is limited primarily to relatively peripheral issues like the
opening, closing, and location of school buildings. The state
alone controls choice and level of educational materials, as well
as the qualifications of teachers. The general principle is that
"the local community builds the (school) house, but the state is
the master of the
In the United States, as already
discussed, the trend has been to decrease substantially the
degree of local control. The shift in the United States toward
greater degrees of state control may have developed for a variety of factors unconnected with funding, not the least of which
is the steady loss of cohesion in our local comrn~nities,4~
but
the German example suggests that control over content of education also tends to be linked to funding. As we move to greater
state funding in order to overcome the disparities that result
from local funding, it seems likely that we will also inexorably
move toward ever greater state control over the substance of
edu~ation.~~

B. Increasing State Control over Education
Increasing state control over education might have its
positive side. The recent success of the "adequacy" claim in
public school finance litigation shows that beyond the issue of
equality lurks the issue of whether U.S. society is devoting an
adequate level of resources to primary and secondary educa-

40.
GRUNDGE
[Constitution]
~
[GG] art. 7, qI 4 (F.R.G.).
41.
Oppermann, supra note 38, at 648.
42.
Id. at 643. The Germans see the control of the Land over the substance of
education as necessary to implement the equality of educational opportunity required by their constitution. Id.
43.
Faber, supra note 16, at 468-69.
44.
The majority of the California Supreme Court denied this phenomenon in
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). " N o matter how the state decides to
finance its system of public education, it can still leave this decision-making power
in the hands of local districts." Id at 1260. While the court's statement is logically
defensible, it seems that experience shows how unlikely it is that financial control
will not be used to expand state power.
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tion. As discussed in sections I1 and 111, local control over the
level of school taxes has arguably resulted in inadequate overall funding for most public schools. Moving to state-wide financing and control of education may be the only way to give
those most concerned about education, especially the teachers
and professional administrators, the visibility and organization
t o obtain a truly "adequate" expenditure for publicly funded
primary and secondary schools.45
In any event, it appears impossible to have both fairlydistributed, adequate resources and meaningful local control at
the same time. The arguments linking local financing and local
control thus have a rational basis: if there is any hope for local
school boards to exercise meaningful control over the schools, it
would appear to be necessary to safeguard the boards' power
through local finance. The trend toward increasing state and
federal control, however, suggests that there will be little
chance for local school boards to exercise meaningful control
over public education in the future.
If the local school board no longer enjoys signifkant local
control, then the disparities of local finance and the accompanying inequities are an unacceptable price to pay. Even in
those states in which there is still substantial local school
board control, enormous inequality in public school finance is
an unacceptably high price to pay. The case law and legislative
developments recounted in section I11 suggest that this perception is spreading in the United States. Perhaps someday our
system will look more like the German system, which a leading
German commentator proudly describes as one that "guarantees 'in principle (dem Grunde nach)' the existence of an equal
opportunity, fully developed educational system and forbids

45.
Cf. Larry G. Simon, T h School Finance Decisions: Collective Bargaining
and Future Finance Systems, 82 YALEL.J.409, 423 (1973) (arguing that centralization of school Gnance will lead to the formation of powerful, state-wide teacher
unions and an increase in collective bargaining at the state level, with the likely
result that overall wages for teachers will rise). It should be noted that Professor
Simon regarded the probable enhancement of teacher union power as more negative than positive. He even seemed d regard it as undesirable that teachers'
views on educational policy might become controlling, stating, "to the extent that
state authorities lack the internalized norms which have tended to stiffen the resistance of local boards to teacher demands, there may be an increased tendency to
regard teacher organizations as presumptively wrred on educational questions." Id.
at 438. While Professor Simon appears to view this possibility with alarm, I would
think that this kind of development may be necessary to attract good teachers to
the public schools and especially to keep them in their jobs.
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radical deviation from that p r i n ~ i p l e Of
. ~ ~course, implementing the principle of equality raises its own set of problems, as
the nuances of the foregoing quotation seem to indicate.47 A
true commitment to equality through state-wide funding would
not end all litigation over school finan~e!~But at this point,
Americans cannot claim that our system of school finance guarantees equal opportunity, even "in principle."
The reasons why the United States has been unable to
make a meaningful commitment to the principle of equality of
educational opportunity are no doubt multiple. Perhaps some
view the current system in quite Machiavellian terms as a n
acceptable cover for blatant discrimination against the poor.
More likely, many are honestly persuaded by the appealing list
of benefits of local control discussed above in section I1 and do
not realize how illusory these benefits are. Clearly, the alternative of centralized state control is unpalatable to large majorities in the United States!'
Thus the tension between equality
and local control creates a difficult conundrum.
One reform which offers at least a partial way out of the
conundrum involves moving the locus of local control from the
district level to the level of the individual schools. Thus a number of current reform proposals--often bearing the label "sitebased managementn-involve transferring greater autonomy to
the individual schools themselves, where councils representing
the parents and guardians of students could play an advisory
or even a governing role.50 "Site-based managementn would
Oppermann, supra note 38, at 625.
46.
47.
Even equality of expenditures per pupil, for example, may not create real
equality of educational opportunity because children from the poorest segments of
the population may be among those the most in need of special education.
Cf. YUDoF ET AL., supra note 2, at 659-67 (describing issues and litigation
48.
concerning intradistrict inequalities).
Cf. Mary A. Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI.
49.
L. REV.519, 525 (1992) ("[IN is almost obligatory for American politicians of both
the right and the left to profess mistrust of government.").
50.
Professor Faber describes the "site-based management" systems adopted by
Hawaii in 1989 and by Kentucky in 1990 and advocated elsewhere by a variety of
scholars. Faber, supra note 16, at 469-72. These systems transfer authority to local
schools and bring parent representatives into a council with teachers and administrators to determine policies left to the individual schools. Despite his contention
that "local school boards will not disappear, because they are too firmly entrenched
and too well accepted by American culture," id. at 467, Professor Faber does not
appear to advocate a very significant role for the district-wide school board. The
"local control" for which he pleads appears to consist chiefly of the type of local
control represented by "site-based management." See also YUDOFET AL., supm note
2, a t 451-58 (describing recent formation of similar local school councils in the Chi-
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appear to create a quite different intermediate structure from
the traditional district-wide school board. The school councils
govern at most one school, not a whole district. As a consequence, while school councils may be given important budgetary powers over their schools, they cannot be given the power
to make budgetary decisions involving several schools, and it
would clearly be impracticable to give each council taxing power. Moreover, since the local school councils all include substantial representation-in some cases, even a majority-of teachers and administrators, unlike the traditional district-wide
school boards, the school councils are much more likely to be
dominated in the long-run by the professional educators.
None of these observations is meant to be an argument
against "site-based management." This approach arguably
injects local influence or control a t the level at which it is most
appropriate. I merely wish to point out that the school councils
will represent a much less independent level of self-governance
than the district-wide school boards have traditionally aspired
to. The nature of the political interaction will presumably be
different, and consequently, the benefits to political culture to
be expected from such intermediate structures should be more
modest than those traditionally claimed for the district-wide
school board. Most importantly, because the individual school is
a n impractically small taxing district, revitalization of local
control at the level of individual schools would serve as no
justification for continuing the present system of local financing
of school districts.

The other reform movement that may appear to offer a
way out of the dilemma between equality of funding and local
control over education is comprised of plans to marketize primary and secondary education, generally through some kind of
voucher system. AU of these proposals share the idea of forcing
the public schools to compete for students, just as private
schools presently do. Equality concerns can-and must-be
addressed by providing public subsidies through "vouchers" for
each student, thereby giving even the poorest students rough
parity of "purchasing" power for education. The more expansive
proposals would force the public schools to compete directly

cap, Illinois area).
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with the private schools by permitting the state vouchers to be
"spent" at any school. This type of proposal could even be accompanied by complete privatization of the public schools,
though that may not be necessary or even wise. More modest
versions of the marketization concept would simply force public
schools to compete against each other by limiting state-provided vouchers to the public schools. Some school districts, especially in large urban areas, have already partially implemented
this idea through the use of "magnet" schools, which accept
applications from the entire school district and differentiate
themselves from other schools in the district according to some
specialty (like science) or special pedagogical approach.51
No matter what form the proposal takes, there are three
principal benefits that marketization might bring. First,
marketization would be a way to break the link between state
financing and state control. Even if massive state subsidies are
necessary to equalize educational opportunity, marketization
may be expected to reduce state regulation by empowering the
individual buyers-in this case the parents and guardians of
children-in effect to regulate the providers of s e ~ c e s - t h e
schools-through their collective action of giving business to
the preferred providers. The regulation provided by a market
approach arguably may be superior to direct state regulation
because it is likely to result in greater flexibility than state
regulation. Schools pursuing many different mixes of educational goals will be able to coexist in the market as long as there
are corresponding groups of buyers willing to spend their allocated resources in sufficient quantity to support these different
kinds of schools. Second, one might also argue that competition
is the best tool to stimulate creativity on the part of teachers
and administrators. Thus we might attempt more and better
experiments to improve the quality of education under a competitive system. Third, freeing each school to compete in this
manner may make careers in education more desirable for
dedicated teachers and administrators by grantihg them more
autonomy in designing the educational curriculum than they
would have under a system of rigorous state control.
Because marketization proposals raise very complex questions, a comprehensive review of these issues is beyond the
scope of this article. Instead, this article concludes with a few
51. For a description of various voucher plans, see generally YUDOFET AL., supra note 2, at 420-38.
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observations about the marketization of education in light of
the foregoing discussion about the benefits and disadvantages
of intermediate control structures for public education. First,
marketization is indefensible if it does not embrace the concept
of equality of educational opportunity as a guiding principle. I t
follows, therefore, that marketization proposals should not necessarily be regarded as ways to reduce tax burdens for education because, like any proposal for reforming education in the
United States, marketization proposals have to include substantial wealth transfers to create greater equality of educational opportunities. Whatever waste may currently exist because of the lack of open competition among schools will likely
be more than offset by the magnitude of the subsidy for the
poor that is necessary to implement the principle of equality.
However, if marketization proposals are able to garner substantial public support, they may prove to be the best tool to
pry out of the ever weary taxpaying public the funds necessary
to provide an "adequate" education to all children in the United
States.
Second, marketization proposals also need to be scrutinized
carefully with respect to the claim that they will reduce state
regulation. Marketization cannot be expected to produce such
a n effect unless, at a minimum, meaningful competition among
schools is created. This is another reason that marketization
plans have to be accompanied by a form of vouchers to provide
substantial subsidies for the poor. In addition, fostering effective competition in many localities may require other kinds of
public investment, such as improving and increasing the subsidies for public transportation. Even if there is adequate competition to permit meaningful choice, the experience with private,
for-profit schools suggests that state regulation must continue
to set educational and social minimum standards and to guard
consumers against fraud and similar kinds of abuse.
Third, marketization plans are likely to reduce further the
governance role of district school boards. The more expansive
marketization plans would make school districts-and their
school boards-largely irrelevant by permitting competition
among schools across district lines. Even if competition is limited to the school district, marketization seems likely to reinforce
the trend toward moving local influence over educational policy
from the district level to the level of the individual schools.
Marketization plans are premised on the assumption that the
individual schools should have significant autonomy so that
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they are free to compete in the educational "market." The
greater the autonomy of the local schools, the weaker the power of the district school board to set educational policy. Moreover, the individual schools will have a n incentive to create
parent-guardian advisory councils as a way of promoting customer satisfaction and loyalty. The result should be a shift in
local control from the district level to the school level, just as in
the case of "site-based management."
Finally, if marketization permits private schools to compete
with public ones, marketization seems likely to change the nature of the community within the school district. As a result,
marketization can be expected to change somewhat the nature
of civic participation at the district school board level and to
diminish the societal benefits of that participation.
Marketization will change the nature of the community by
virtue of the way market mechanisms affect personal relationships. The market mechanism is individualistic and atomistic,
the very opposite of a communitarian vision of society. Markets
are structured to give buyers power over the services offered in
the market through the device of "exit," that is, by choosing to
purchase from a different provider of services when they are
dissatisfied with their current provider's services. When exit is
quite expensive-as is generally true under our current system
of publicly funded schools from which one can exit only by
agreeing to pay tuition for a private education in addition to
taxes for public education-then dissatisfied subjects of public
education have a strong incentive t o use "voice" as their control
mechanism by publicly complaining and seeking to persuade
school teachers, administration, and even the school board to
make the changes they desire.52
Non-market systems that force the participants to rely on
"voice" would thus appear to be better designed to secure the
putative benefits of intermediate structures than market systems that facilitate control through "exit." Easy exit would

52.

The obligatory citation for the terms "exit" and "voicen is ALBEm 0 .

HIRSCHMAN, E m , VOICE,AND LOYALTY(1970). I, however, first learned of these
terms through the very interesting application to financial systems in JOHN
ZYSMAN,GOVERNMENTS,
MARKETS, AND GROWTH
57-95 (1983).
Of course, some parents or guardians may have little opportunity for exit because of their low level of education and their poverty and yet feel that they cannot exercise voice for the same reasons. Lack of opportunity to exit does not ensure meaningful voice. It only means that the parties have a strong incentive to
use voice.
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appear t o be especially inimical to the formation of community,
yet in order to obtain meaningful competition in the market,
exit has to be made fairly easy. In a community from which i t
is relatively easy to exit, parties who hold very different views
about the kind of education desirable are not necessarily compelled to negotiate with each other.53The atomizing impact of
the market may even minimize the benefits of community participation in advisory committees for the local schools since
there, too, exit will provide a n alternative to voice. Thus, instead of "schools for citizenship" and "seedbeds for republican
virtue," marketization plans promise to create "schools for
smart shopping."
Marketization therefore cannot be expected to revitalize
district school board control. I t may produce a measure of significant local control over educational policy. However, to the
extent that district school boards or local school advisory councils play a role in the governance of marketized schools, one
can expect that benefits to the political culture will be attenuated by the ready availability of exit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The traditional system of governing and financing the
public schools through local community school districts thus
cannot be salvaged. The inequality inherent in finance based
on local district wealth is too pernicious to be tolerated any
longer. To eliminate the gross disparities, substantial statewide tax revenues are required. The options for control are
then (1) greater centralized state control over the schools, (2)
greater autonomy for individual schools with local control exercised, though probably only in a relatively weak fashion,
through advisory councils for each school, or (3) marketization.
I t does not appear reasonable to expect that the local school
boards can be given back substantial power over education,
especially if significant state taxes are going to be used to eliminate interdistrict funding disparities.
The control issues will undoubtedly continue to be debated
quite heatedly in the United States. The situation calls for bold
experimentation." It seems that the dominant and character53. Cf. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATION
68 (1987) ("Voucher plans attempt to avoid rather than settle our disagreements over how to develop democratic character through schooling.").
54.
It is surprising to discover, for example, that a number of other countries

6231

PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING

643

istic American tradition of skepticism toward bureaucracy will
lead the nation t o reject the first option. The second and third
options both provide for some measure of local control, but this
article has argued that the benefits to the political culture from
such local control may not be large in either case. If that is so,
there is little prospect of recreating a t the level of individual
schools the benefits for political life of the traditional system of
self-governing district school boards. In any event, it seems
clear that broad, meaningful control by the school boards themselves cannot be revitalized. The desirability of local control
being exercised by district school boards therefore no longer
can justify the discrimination inherent in a system of school
finance in which the determinative factor is the wealth of the
local school district.
This is not to argue that local school boards must necessarily be abolished. There may be a role for them to play (a) as a
coordinator of the various schools in the district, or (b) as a
shield protecting the administration and teaching staff from
overly intrusive state government regulation. It is simply necessary to recognize that they do not and cannot in the future
wield the kind of control that might justify insisting on the
principle of local funding for the schools. Only then can the
dark side of this intermediate structure be overcome by a genuine commitment to equality of educational opportunity in the
United States.

are experimenting with forms of marketization for primary and secondary education. The Danes are apparently the leaders in creating a free market in schools,
but Great Britain and Singapore have also experimented with marketization plans
Nov. 21, 1992, Suprecently. See A Survey of Education: Coming Top, ECONOMIST,
plement, at 12-15.

